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The EU Promotion of Security Cooperation in the Non-European World: 
 The case of ASEAN and Myanmar   
Dr Ludovica MARCHI (PhD) 
 
This paper explores the EU’s attempts at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to encourage 
Myanmar directly, or indirectly via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to 
connect with security cooperation. The EU was an advocate of security cooperation and 
behaved as a sponsor by encouraging others to adhere to it. The paper argues that both 
ASEAN’s assumption of responsibility and Myanmar’s taking on of multilateral security 
options were linked to the EU’s policy at ARF. In order to demonstrate this, the paper, first, 
provides an historical insight into the EEC/EU’s relations with ASEAN, in 1980, leading to 
the EU’s participation in the ARF in 1993. Furthermore, it focuses on the EU’s messages at 
the Forum when the EU and ASEAN co-chaired the ARF meetings. Meetings co-chaired by 
both were held between 2004 and 2008. The investigation relates to the ARF as to a 
framework where interactions develop, and uses Cyclone Nargis that ravaged Myanmar in 
2008 to assess Myanmar and ASEAN’s conduct. In evaluating Yangon and the Association’s 
behaviour, the paper is helped by explanations provided by social mechanisms, an 
appropriateness logic and observations derived from interviews conducted in Southeast Asia 
and Brussels. The choice of Cyclone Nargis is justified by the dialogue and training activities 
in the ARF being concerned with crisis management and disaster relief. The investigation 
concludes highlighting the EU’s role with regard to the Forum and the promotion of security 
cooperation in the non-European world. Archival primary sources inform this paper which 
covers the interaction between the EU and Myanmar before the outbreak of the Rohingya 
crisis, which gave EU policies towards Myanmar a new dimension.1  
 
Introduction 
This paper deals with the EU’s ambition to inspire others, particularly Myanmar and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),2 to embrace multilateral security 
cooperation. That ambition originated in the EU’s conviction that interaction, or                                                         
1 I am grateful to Jan van der Harst for having organized the conference on ‘Europe and East Asia since 
1945: an historical survey’, University of Groningen, 14-15 June 2018, which created interesting debates 
which also enriched my paper.  
2 ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok, by the five original member countries: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Later, other nations joined: Brunei Darussalam (8 January 
1984), Vietnam (28 July 1995), Laos and Myanmar (23 July 1997) and lastly Cambodia (30 April 1999).  
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cooperation, produces a combined effect that is greater than the sum of the separate 
effects that single entities might offer. This belief characterised the essence of the EU and 
was taken by the EU to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 
1993, and which was the leading platform in Asia for dialogue and cooperation on 
security. Beside its appeal as a context focused on dialogue and security cooperation, 
ARF was of great interest to the EU, bringing together nations across the Asia-Pacific 
region: the ten members of ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Russia, South Korea and the United States, plus the EU. It was within the ARF 
framework that the EU, for the first time, co-chaired a meeting with Myanmar in early 
2014, which it hosted in Brussels.3 The meeting concerned the Defence Officials’ 
Dialogue and Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and 
Preventive Diplomacy. It was planned to discuss various aspects related to security 
cooperation in Asia including ‘humanitarian assistance and disaster relief’.4 Since 
diffidence and restraint from joining action with other organisations or states particularly 
in the security field proved to be the norm in Yangon,5 that development concerning the 
EU and Myanmar’s common security endeavour calls for an understanding of when a 
EU’s linkage to Myanmar’s security might have originated.  
This exploration will be conducted via the connections of the EU with ASEAN. Since 
ARF’s inception, it was agreed that ASEAN would be the primary driving force and 
would chair the annual meeting. Hence, the EU’s quest to promote Myanmar’s security 
cooperation is explored via examining the meetings that the EU co-chaired with ASEAN. 
The ARF Inter-sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive 
Diplomacy for both 2004/05 and 2006/07, and the ARF Workshop on Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe, in 2008, were co-
chaired by the EU. Combined, these meetings portray the perception of the EU’s support 
for multilateral solutions to security problems. Also, they allow the EU’s ARF policy to 
be related to the position of Yangon and ASEAN concerning Cyclone Nargis’ violence                                                         
3 Myanmar has, however, been meeting EU representatives on security matters also prior to this meeting, 
within the ARF and in other fora.   
4 EIAS [European Institute for Asian Studies], EU Quietly Hosts ASEAN Regional Forum Meetings, EIAS 
Policy Brief, Brussels, 2014.  
5 Formerly known as Rangoon, Yangon is the biggest city, whereas Naypyitaw is the country’s capital.  
 
   3 
against Myanmar in 2008. Since the ARF’s dialogue and many of the training actions 
regarded crisis management and disaster relief, Cyclone Nargis is a pertinent case to 
assess Yangon and the Association’s behaviour. The meetings are inspected through the 
co-chair’s summary reports or joint declarations with the Association. 
The paper focuses on the ARF as a setting where interactions of several interests 
occur. Interests may include the promotion of one’s own identity as well as the 
publicisation of multilateral security options, or the encouragement to undertake security 
responsibilities. They may involve communicating the value of integration, or supporting 
the belief that no single country can address, by itself, threats that transcend borders, or 
solve the root causes of crises. All of these ambitions and aspirations the EU attempted to 
forward at the ARF, in its endeavour to motivate Yangon’s interest in security 
cooperation. Ambitions and aspirations, ultimately, represented the EU’s desire and goal 
of expanding its influence outside its own region.  
Tracing the EU’s efforts, at the ARF, directly or indirectly to induce Myanmar’s junta 
to cooperate in the area of security, this paper explores how the EU relates to the Forum 
in an historical context, thus considering the European Economic Community’s (EEC) 
relations with ASEAN before the founding of the ARF. Next, it examines the EU’s 
messages and policy at the Forum, and, later, enquires whether ASEAN and Myanmar 
were, possibly, interested in the EU’s ARF discourses, and investigates the response that 
the destructive Nargis has generated in ASEAN and Myanmar. Supported by social 
mechanisms 6  and observations obtained from the interviewees, the paper analyses 
ASEAN’s conduct in the event of Nargis, that eventually led to the EU’s principles being 
expressed at the Forum. Helped by the interviewees’ comments and the appropriateness 
logic,7 the paper explains Myanmar’s behaviour in the aftermath of the cyclone’s crisis, 
which is connected with the EU’s ARF policy. The EU’s role at the ARF as well as with 
regard to ASEAN and Myanmar and the promotion of security cooperation outside its 
own region, in the non-European world, concludes the paper. This investigation is mainly 
based on archival primary sources and interviews with officials from the European                                                         
6  J.T. CHECKEL, Social Construction and Integration, in Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1999), 4, 
pp. 545-60.  
7  J.G. MARCH, J.P. OLSEN, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, Arena 
Working Paper No. 5, Oslo, 1998.    
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External Action Service and the European Commission, both in Brussels, and also with 
security policy analysts in Singapore, a Myanmar’s historian, an officer from the ASEAN 
Secretariat, ASEAN leaders close to the ARF organization and ASEAN leaders in 
general, all in Southeast Asia. The paper focuses on interactions between the EU and 
Myanmar preceding the outburst of the Rohingya crisis, which added a new dimension to 
EU policies towards Myanmar.  
1. The EU and the Forum: 
The historical context 
As an historical context to the EU and the ASEAN Regional Forum, we cannot 
undervalue that, when the EU engaged in the ARF in 1993, its relationship with ASEAN 
was already strong. In 1972, informal ties with ASEAN were firstly established by the 
Council of the European Economic Community. In 1977, their relations were formalised 
at the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, and institutionalised with the signing of 
the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement in March 1980. The agreement was decided as 
a follow-up to the friendly relations between the member states of the Community and 
the member countries of ASEAN, and was rooted in their commitment to strengthen 
economic growth.  
The agreement affirmed the parties’ purpose to contribute to a new phase of 
international economic cooperation. By this, they meant to give substance to the 
determination to open their markets, and not only to deepen but also to differentiate their 
commercial and economic interactions in order to meet each other’s needs in terms of 
comparative gain and common advantage. Accordingly, the agreement took into account 
the differing degrees of development of the Association’s member countries, and, in spite 
of their diversities, it specified that the partners were equal. The belief in a new phase of 
international economic cooperation was strengthened by the desire to promote new trade 
patterns, procedures linking the commercial operators of the two regions, and innovative 
practices that would boost exchanges and support measures for overcoming the barriers. 
Facilitating the entry to the markets of both regions appeared to promise positive effects. 
In terms of imports and exports, the ASEAN countries were the fourth major trading 
partners of the EEC’s member states. Between 1980 and 2000, the number of interactions 
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grew by 33 per cent each year and expanded from EUR 14 billion, in 1980, to EUR 105 
billion by 2000.8  
The ASEAN-EEC agreement aimed, above all, to provide an element of balance in 
international relations, thus underlining its political dimension. Such a breadth was 
encouraged by the EEC’s recognition of the rise of ASEAN as a cohesive group which 
contributed to the stability and peace in Southeast Asia.9 This acknowledgment crucially 
advanced the political aspect of their interactions. Balance in international affairs meant 
that security needed to be considered. An emphasis on security materialised in 1993 as 
soon as ASEAN proposed a multilateral setting in the Asia-Pacific region, where the 
participants would collectively build up a dialogue on regional and sub-regional security. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum10 was a purposeful working relationship that the EEC/EU 
embraced with enthusiasm, particularly because it was the only measure in Asia 
providing an arena for wide-ranging exchanges on security issues. As a dialogue partner, 
the EEC/EU participated since the ARF’s first meeting in 1994, abiding by the instruction 
that discussions were consensus-oriented and that conflictual debate was to be avoided. 
The EU’s priority was deemed to support the efforts by the Asian countries to enhance 
the security in the region.11 
The EU wondered why, while ‘global military expenditure’ plummeted by 20 per cent 
in 1993, by contrast such disbursement flourished in East Asia alone. Territorial 
disagreements combined with rapid economic growth and ambitious armament 
programmes, suspicions of the other and the fragility of multilateral organisations 
regarding political consultation were features that easily led to conflicts. These 
imbalances encroached on the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
                                                        
8 COOPERATION AGREEMENT between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – member countries of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 144/2, 10.6.80. European Union External 
Action, Treaties Office; 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/SummartOfTreatyAction.do?step=0&treatyId=373 [last accessed 
14.09.2018]. 
9 Ibid.  
10 The ARF establishment was agreed in Singapore in July 1993, and its inauguration a year later in 
Bangkok.  
11 The communication from THE COMMISSION of the European Communities TO THE COUNCIL, 
Towards a New Asia Strategy (COM(94) 314 final, Brussels. 13.07.1994), pp. 4, 9; 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A51994DC0314 [last accessed14.09.2018].   
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(CFSP) of the EU.12 The EU’s action centred on deterrence and arms control as vital 
components of the CFSP.  
In accordance with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU felt naturally 
committed to providing support for conflict prevention, crisis management and disaster 
relief, with Myanmar and the Indonesian and the Philippine archipelagos being at the top 
of the list.13 Analogously, the EU believed in the importance of the rapid evolution of the 
ARF14 to the extent that developing abilities connected with confidence building, 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution appeared likely to bring about benefits and 
create a greater capacity for dealing with demanding situations. It hoped that co-chairing 
the Intersessional Group meetings with ASEAN could expedite the ARF’s progress. 
Through attempting to add substance to this informal multilateral dialogue, the EU 
gained the ASEAN’s attention, as expressed through a common declaration in which the 
two regional groups advanced their joint pledge to promote ‘stability in the Asia Pacific 
region, with ASEAN as a driving force’.15 The EU may have sought a dual commitment 
to conflict prevention and crisis management, as a kind of guarantee that ASEAN, too, 
felt that responsibility. Moreover, by stressing the fact that ASEAN was the driving force, 
it may have sought to strengthen ASEAN’s duty in this regard. The EU considered these 
areas, conflict prevention and crisis management,16 as obligations that it could share with 
ASEAN for combined action, believing it useful to explore a common discourse with the 
ASEAN countries on these matters.  
In fact, the EU insisted on pointing out its engagement to deepening this dialogue. It 
declared that ‘confidence building’ and ‘crisis management’ were expected to enrich the 
EU’s security discourse with ASEAN in the form of knowledge transfer and the                                                         
12 Ibid., p.11.  
13  ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for an Enhanced Partnership’, Communication from the 
Commission, COM (2001) 469. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 4 September 
2001, p. 21; https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-europe-asia-strategic-
framework-com2001469-20010904_en.pdf [last accessed 14.09.2018].  
14 European Commission (2004) ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’, Communication from the 
Commission, COM (2003) 399. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 13; 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_116277.pdf  [last accessed 14.09.2018].   
15 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, C/07/54, Nuremberg, 15 March 2007 7588/07 (Presse 54) 
Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, p. 3; europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-07-54_en.pdf [last accessed 14.09.2018].  
 
16 The communication from THE COMMISSION…(13.07.1994), op. cit., p. 11.   
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exchange of best practices.17 In mentioning confidence building, the EU was referring to 
procedures focused on the development of skills and attitudes in groups and individuals 
with regard to the formation, management and maintenance of processes which were 
locally meaningful. By citing crisis management in its civilian aspects, the EU was 
relating to the entire range of non-military operations that were required in crisis 
situations, which included disaster relief and civil protection.18 Finally, by disaster relief, 
the EU indicated those measures arranged to ensure a coordinated response in order to 
increase the local resilience of the people affected by natural or man-made disasters.19 
Through stating these plans, it anticipated that the EU would become involved with the 
other ARF participants, particularly ASEAN and Myanmar, to promote self-reliance and 
confidence in common operations.   
In contributing to the ARF, the Union sought to develop ways to make its own 
particular input felt. It estimated that ‘the European experience gained from establishing 
and operating the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) may be 
of a certain relevance’ in this regard.20 This proposition conveyed the view that 
multilateralism, sharing security problems and endorsing cooperation, and also 
supporting progress in the full respect of freedom, equality and justice were on the EU’s 
agenda. This implied that the EU intended to spread around, and share with the ASEAN 
member countries, its own expanded concept of security, which included political, 
human, social and economic dimensions. The EU was inspired by the purposefulness of 
the ARF also concerning its specific interest in transmitting all of these principles and 
values to that distant region, and appeared to be attempting to enhance its aspiration to 
promote security cooperation outside the European world.  
Hence, both the EU and ASEAN built a dynamic partnership in the non-traditional 
security field. In 1996, when the criteria for participation were adopted, it was decided 
                                                        
17 2007 Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership 
Adopted by Head of State / Government, ASEAN/EU Commemorative Summit, Singapore, 27 November, 
p. 2.   
18 J. HOWORTH, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2014, 2nd 
ed., p. 71.   
19 Disaster relief measures, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC; 
http://csis.org/programs/international-security-program/asia-division/cross-strait-security-initiative-
/confidence-b [last accessed 16.07.2018]. 
20 The communication from THE COMMISSION…(13.07.1994), op. cit., p. 11.    
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that all ASEAN countries were automatically members of the ARF. The norms 
established that all new entrants should ‘agree to abide by and respect fully the decisions 
and statements already made by the ARF’.21 Whereas new participants had to 
demonstrate to have an impact on peace and security – in terms of peace among the many 
ethnic groups, societal freedom and respect for peoples’ rights, Myanmar led by the 
military leadership could not guarantee such a responsibility. Therefore, after it became 
ASEAN member in 1997, Myanmar’s inclusion in the ARF could promise no obligation 
regarding its contribution to peace and security.  
Several groups and sub-groups, where the EU was a dialogue partner, were organised 
coherently with ARF’s working method both for discussion and training reasons. The 
convening of the groups was at the inter-governmental level. The meetings were, among 
others, the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building and Preventive 
Diplomacy which reflected the three stages of development of the ARF’s activities: 
confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and approach elaboration to conflicts.22 The 
Inter-sessional Meetings on Cooperative Activities also included disaster relief. The 
meetings shaped a dialogue on security perceptions and provided defence policy papers.  
With the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 becoming effective 
in 2009, the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) was created. The 
HR/VP was in charge of the EU’s external branch, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and represented the EU and its member states at the Forum. The EEAS and EU 
member states have taken part in several ARF work strands and cooperated with ASEAN 
in drawing and adopting ARF statements. The EU contributed to the Forum where 
Myanmar joined as a full actor in its capacity. The EU’s determination to share 
consultations on regional, political and security matters, in the ARF, was also supported 
by the goal of promoting other actors, and, specifically, Myanmar’s engagement in 
security cooperation.23                                                          
21 ASEAN Regional Forum; http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html [last accessed 16.07.2018] 
22 Chairman Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 
1995; http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-statements-and-reports/133.html [last 
accessed 16.07.2018]. 
23 L. Marchi, Interview with official (A) of the EEAS, of the Crisis Response and Operational 
Coordination, Brussels, June 2014.   
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2. The EU’s ARF policy 
The EU’s policy on Myanmar developed through the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy sanctioning the military junta since 1991 and through the EU-ASEAN dialogue.24 
ASEAN was a moderator of any possible EU overtone admonishing Myanmar and 
demanding transformations. EU-ASEAN’s relations suffered when Myanmar joined 
ASEAN in 1997, and when it was accepted to ARF. ASEAN’s accomplishment of the 
vision of the ASEAN founders and project of successful regionalism had called for these 
inclusions. 25  To assess the EU’s ARF policy that could be related to convincing 
Myanmar’s military junta to connect with security cooperation, the meeting in Potsdam, 
in 2005, is investigated, since it offers a direct reference to Myanmar’s government in the 
conclusive EU-ASEAN’s declaration. 
In Potsdam, at the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building 
Measures, co-chaired by the EU on 21-23 February, representatives of Myanmar’s junta 
sought to convince the participants, including the EU representatives, that the course of 
their country’s reform was on track, and specifically the implementation of the Seven 
Step Roadmap to Democracy.26 The Roadmap promised to address security issues, and 
was seen to offer an opportunity to implement ‘ceasefire strategies’ in Myanmar.27 The 
Seven Step programme was a matter of such interest to the EU that Yangon’s compliance 
would have moderated the EU’s sanction policy. Its observance also engaged ASEAN, 
firstly, because of its true support for a transition in Myanmar and also because it was 
believed to soothe the international agitation with the military junta which affected the 
Association itself. 
The EU’s belief in the Forum’s influence? 
Possibly, in Potsdam, to break down the wall that separated the processes under way in 
ASEAN as a whole (the integration efforts of ASEAN’s regionalism) and Myanmar (the                                                         
24 For a thorough account of the EU’s policy on Myanmar, see L. MARCHI, Obstinate and Unmovable? 
The EU vis-à-vis Myanmar via EU-ASEAN. Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 6-
1(2014).  
25 A. ACHARYA, Regionalism and the emerging world order: sovereignty, autonomy and identity, in: S. 
BRESLIN et al. (eds), New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases, Routledge, 
London, 2002, pp. 20-33.  
26 Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support 
Group on Confidence Building Measures, Potsdam, 21-23 February 2005.   
27 L. JONES, Explaining Myanmar’s regime transition: the periphery is central. Democratization, 1-
23(2014), p. 16.  
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vocal intention to comply with the Seven Step reforms), the EU delegates focused on 
what they conceivably thought to be the success of multilateral participation (that the EU 
privileged and supported) in approaching security situations. The EU officials 
concentrated on threats to non-traditional security, particularly crisis prevention. They 
indicated that a combined process of multilateral inputs and arrangements, rather than a 
single country’s efforts, more easily antagonised complex situations. Governments acting 
unilaterally were putting themselves at a disadvantage. To that scope, the officials 
explained the concept of the (at that time) European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), which was described as that process which aimed at strengthening the EU’s 
‘external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in 
conflict prevention and crisis management’.28 The idea of the role played by the EU in 
preventing and easing crises emerged as a model of the action that ASEAN, its members, 
Myanmar included (and ARF participants) could provide to the region when such support 
seemed necessary to the group. It was an encouragement to take up responsibilities.  
 
The EU’s further insistence 
In Helsinki, in 2007, at the other ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy co-chaired by the EU on 28-30 March, the 
EU sought to promote confidence building practices through discussing the Organisation 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) ‘potential for strengthening ties with the 
ARF’. 29  Already at a previous meeting that it co-chaired in Phnom Penh on 26-28 
October 2004, i.e. the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, 
the EU had succeeded in promoting the inclusion of the ‘need to maintain informal 
contacts’ with the OSCE in the ARF’s official position.30 The EU’s message, at that time, 
focused on showing the two groups’ constructive and productive interaction. The EU 
shared experience of good governance, democratic transition, human rights and minority 
rights with the OSCE. In Helsinki, the EU’s multilateral influence featured more 
                                                        
28 Co-Chairs' Summary Report…, Potsdam, 21-23 February 2005, op. cit.   
29 Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support 
Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, Helsinki, 28-30 March 2007.  
30 Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support 
Group on Confidence Building Measures, Phnom Penh, 26-28 October 2004.  
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intensely through the explanation to the ASEAN nations, and there within, Myanmar, of 
the OSCE’s expansion, progress, structure and activities.31  
The same endeavour was pursued at the successive co-chaired event in Berlin on 12-
14 March 2008, the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive 
Diplomacy in Asia and Europe. There, ‘transparency’ and ‘information’ were examined 
and used as examples of practices that could develop and characterise security behaviour 
among the countries of Southeast Asia and other ARF participants. These practices were 
posited as fundamental to a policy associated with an ‘open’ dialogue on security. The 
representatives of the EU argued for the adoption of a common security concept together 
with the development of politically binding standards and the gradual institutionalisation 
of cooperation as processes offering a solid and durable basis for security collaboration.32  
The Berlin meeting contributed towards explaining how several steps were appropriate 
for building up useful partnerships: the upgrading of communication conceivably via a 
reliable network among the ARF participants, the institution of information exchange 
systems, and the improved cooperation on non-traditional security such as health issues, 
haze or yellow dust. To these propositions, the development of information exchange 
mechanisms, and also the establishment of a crisis room, or some other kind of early-
warning instruments, were added. The co-chairs stressed that anyone should be part of 
the implementation phase and become a leading actor in fostering confidence building 
and preventive diplomacy in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. 33  However, the 
fundamental question of whether or not some of these discourses were going to have 
consequences among the regional players, specifically ASEAN and Myanmar, remained 
crucial. 
3. Seduced by the EU’s ARF talks?  
As co-chair of the ARF meetings, the EU underscored the multilateral character of its 
position on security, stressing its experience and seeking to inspire others. As an actor 
that has aimed to activate the diverse potential, principles, and competences of its 
                                                        
31 Co-Chairs' Summary Report…, Helsinki, 28-30 March 2007, op. cit.   
32 Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive 
Diplomacy in Asia and Europe. Berlin, 12–14 March 2008.   
33 Ibid. 
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partners34 while operating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the EU has sought to provide 
suggestions concerning security cooperation, confidence building and disaster relief. 
Yet, concerning ASEAN, the EU and OSCE’s argument that the gradual 
institutionalisation of cooperation underpinned their common action contrasted with 
ARF’s and ASEAN’s distinctive loose character as a collective security arena for 
dialogue. It antagonised ASEAN’s low institutionalised cooperation approach.35 In 
addition, as an official from the EEAS interviewed in Brussels confirmed, the suggested 
commitment to an open security dialogue, made distinctive by ‘transparency and sharing 
information’, was out of step with the secrecy with which security and defence choices 
were made in the ASEAN group.36  
Regarding Myanmar, with the obligation that it established in the 2008 constitution to 
preserve the nation’s sovereignty and, more specifically, the sovereignty of its decision-
making in the field of security, Myanmar was conceivably indifferent to the messages 
addressed by the EU at the Forum. Myanmar’s leadership declared a commitment to 
implementing the Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy, which meant that Myanmar was 
forced to embrace a multifaceted process with numerous preparations and arrangements. 
A full sequence of actions was required: convening a National Convention to draft the 
constitution; taking steps to establish democracy after the National Convention was 
concluded; drafting a constitution based on the principles laid down by the National 
Convention; organising a national referendum to approve the redrafted constitution; 
holding free and fair elections for a Parliament; and building a modern and democratic 
nation through the support of the leaders elected by Parliament.37 Incentives to change, 
promoted by the EU, in favour of Myanmar’s transformation were there, spelled out at 
                                                        
34 The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2013) 30 final, Brussels, 11 December 2013; 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf [last accessed 16.07.2018].   
35 The ASEAN Regional Forum, A Concept Paper, 2006. Document series 1994-2006. However, ASEAN 
was engaged in building a security community among its members, including Myanmar, and the EU-
OSCE’s experience of cooperation could offer inputs to that Association’s project. 
36 L. Marchi, Interview with official (A)…, Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, Brussels, 2014, 
op. cit.   
37 M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY, Myanmar’s 2010 Elections: Boon or Bane for ASEAN’s Political and 
Security Community? In: Democracy and Discontent: The 2010 Elections in Myanmar, AIIA Political 
Commentary, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, 2010, pp. 25-32, 26-7; 
www.internationalaffairs.org.au/.../democracy-and-discontent-the-2010-... [last accessed 16.07.2018]. 
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ARF, ready to be taken up by the military junta. Yet, the fulfilment of the transformation 
was still a neglected project.  
The encouragement to incorporate fundamental freedoms, minority rights and 
democratic transition into the indivisibility of the security concept, as it has been 
embraced by both the EU and OSCE, was an example of the expectations of the junta’s 
steps towards democracy. That progress was, however, irreconcilable with the thinking of 
Myanmar’s administration.38 Also, as an interviewed official from the EEAS implied, in 
the unfortunate case of a crisis occurring in the region, there was no chance that 
Myanmar’s authorities would provide assistance to their ASEAN partners, or accept 
ASEAN’s assistance. 39  This issue was interpreted as indicating that Myanmar’s 
authorities felt engaged in focusing on in-house matters and feared that external 
interventions would interact with their system of governance. Henceforth, the junta 
leadership developed a kind of isolated policy which diverged from the multilateralism 
communicated by the EU.  
Accordingly, on the key question of whether ASEAN and Myanmar were persuaded 
by the EU’s discourse and promotion of EU’s values at ARF, there were zero 
expectations that the EU’s proposals would be absorbed by the two. Neither ASEAN nor 
Myanmar was believed to be willing or able to adapt to the EU’s address and adopt a 
multilateral cooperation policy that was coherent with the EU’s suggestions. However, 
their willingness or ability to develop or accept joint multilateral options can be tested. 
The reaction to Cyclone Nargis, that occurred at around the same time as the ARF 
Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and 
Europe, co-chaired by the EU in Berlin, provides this test. 
 
4. Nargis’ generation of political responses 
In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ravaged Myanmar’s Irrawaddy Delta causing huge 
destruction and loss of life. Initially, with regard to Myanmar, the government was 
overwhelmed by the magnitude and complexity of the disaster relief problems. The                                                         
38 C. ROBERTS, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010; N. FARRELLY, Discipline without democracy: Military 
dominance in post-colonial Burma, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67, 3, (2013), pp. 321-326.   
39 L. Marchi, Interview with official (B) of the EEAS, of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, 
Brussels, June 2014. 
   14 
junta’s attitude, particularly at the beginning of the crisis, in refusing external help, did 
little to diminish the difficulties. The EU, and other external agents, was barred from 
being an actor by the military government’s inflexible non-interference policy.40 ARF did 
not enter into action in spite of reports that ‘… it may have been that ARF Senior 
Officials were among the first to meet soon afterwards Nargis had struck’.41 However, it 
was the Association that was the predominant actor in the cyclone’s circumstance. 
ASEAN’s activity was vital in networking with the government in Myanmar and other 
international actors that were ready to assist. It made possible the constitution of the 
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, led by the ASEAN Secretary General. The Task 
Force operated through the Tripartite Core Group (TCG: the Government of Myanmar, 
ASEAN and the UN), coordinated the relief work and delivered assistance. It was the 
first ASEAN-led mechanism that involved ASEAN member states individually and 
collectively, in addition to the international community and the UN. Its recognised value 
was to have built a regional response to a local problem.42 Acting as a bridge between the 
junta and the donor nations’ funding, through the TCG, ASEAN allowed, for example, 
the financing and development of the Commission’s Post-Cyclone Nargis recovery and 
preparedness plan over three years, starting in 2009.43 
Concerning Myanmar, what resulted from the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force’s 
intervention in the country was a softened non-interference stance by the military junta. 
The change in the government’s approach to policy-making was tangible, and was also 
confirmed by Brussels, where Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner acknowledged the opening 
up of an ‘unprecedented dialogue’ with Myanmar’s government.44  
 
 
                                                         
40 See: A. SELTH, Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, 3, (2008), pp. 379-402.   
41 J. HAACKE, N. MORADA, 2010. The ARF and cooperative security: more of the same? in: J. 
HAACKE, N. MORADA (eds) Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: the Asean Regional Forum, 
Routledge, Basingstoke, pp. 219-232, 228.  
42 Chairman’s Statement of the 15th ASEAN Regional Forum…, 2008, Singapore, op. cit.   
43 Commission welcomes launch of Post-cyclone Nargis recovery and preparedness plan for 
Myanmar/Burma, European Commission Press Release Database, Brussels, 9 February 2009; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-231_en.htm?locale=en [last accessed 16.07.2018].  
44 Ibid. 
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5. ASEAN’s reaction to Nargis examined:  
Responding to the EU’s call for undertaking responsibilities?  
The social mechanisms  
It might be useful to inspect how the unexpected development of ASEAN providing 
crisis support for the Nargis-hit Myanmar came about. The dynamics activated by social 
mechanisms might help us to understand how this new outcome could have materialised. 
Social mechanisms suggest that there are processes whereby actors acquire new interests 
and preferences through contact with other contexts, either discursive structures or 
norms.45 Three points discuss this view: ‘group learning’, ‘ability to persuade’ and the 
‘crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ dynamics.  
Group learning 
There was no lack of transformative discourses at the ARF meetings through which to 
promote ‘group learning’ and dispense norms, as vehicles of new interests.46 The Inter-
sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, the Peacekeeping groups, 
and those related to Search, Rescue and Disaster Relief, received growing support from 
the personnel from the EU External Service. These officials were from the Crisis 
Response and Operational Coordination section. 47  Also officials from the European 
Commission’s department, providing emergency assistance and relief to the victims of 
natural disasters and armed conflict outside the European Union, were in contact with the 
ARF groups. Frequent exchanges with the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO) personnel for assistance and long-term follow-up were, likewise, 
confirmed.48 Relations among these personnel and the groups’ participants indicate that 
communication spread and competence and knowledge were disseminated. The working 
clusters, training and security exercises, and other groups met several times during 2004-
2008. As the interviewed EEAS officials acknowledged, it was inevitable that 
interactions were going to develop new interests. The purpose of the frequency and 
                                                        
45 J.T. CHECKEL, p. 548, op. cit.  
46 Ibid. 
47 L. Marchi, Interview with official (B)…, Crisis Response…, Brussels, 2014, op. cit.  
48 L. Marchi, Interview with official (C), Rapid Response Coordinator, European Commission, Brussels, 
June 2014. 
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thickness of the networking was to promote new learning.49 This result is congruent with 
the belief that ‘where a group met repeatedly, and where there was a high density of 
interactions among participants’ new interests were most likely to be generated.50  
 
Ability to persuade 
Contributing to acquire new preferences and goals, the ‘ability to persuade’ was not a 
minor factor. The EEAS and ECHO personnel, those from OSCE and the EU co-chairs, 
were recognised as having sway over the attendants during training and assistance in the 
practical exercises. Whether this result was due to their personal ability or to other 
reasons would seem unclear. Though, the interviewed ASEAN leaders close to the ARF 
organisation51 and security policy analysts52 have acknowledged that the persons 
involved in the Forum’s activities, in most cases, had an enhanced persuasive capability, 
which they accredited to the authority of their position. The interviewed maintained that 
the persuasive ability provided guidance, and that guidance had the power to influence 
the actors’ inclinations.53 Also this result matches the suggestion that, when the persuader 
was an authoritative member of the in-group to which the person possibly or 
prospectively being persuaded belonged or wanted to belong (e.g. representative of 
ASEAN or of its member states), persuasion was most likely to materialise.54  
 
Crisis and policy failure 
Also the crisis and policy failure dynamics is able to develop new interests and roles. 
Since it was agreed to give shape to the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN set the norm 
that its group was to remain in a higher ranked position compared to the other 
participants’, due to its role as originator of the Forum. Interviewed ASEAN leaders55 
suggested that during the ‘crisis’ of the cyclone that hit and damaged the Irrawaddy delta,                                                         
49 L. Marchi, Interview with official (A)…, Crisis Response…, Brussels, 2014, op. cit.; L. Marchi, 
Interview with official (B)…, Crisis Response…, Brussels, 2014, op. cit.     
50 J.T. CHECKEL, p. 549, op. cit.  
51 L. Marchi, Interviews with ASEAN leaders (D) close to the ARF organisation, Canberra, September 
2013.   
52 L. Marchi, Interviews with security policy analysts (E), Singapore, February 2014.  
53 L. Marchi, Interviews with ASEAN leaders (D) close to the ARF organisation,…. Canberra, 2013, op. 
cit.; L. Marchi, Interviews with security policy analysts (E),…, Singapore, 2014, op. cit.  
54 J.T. CHECKEL, p. 550, op. cit.  
55 L. Marchi, Interviews with ASEAN leaders (F), Macau, May 2013. 
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the ASEAN group was discouraged. Sensing the emergency on its shoulders, the group 
felt an added responsibility. The role of dealing with the crisis emerged as an obligation. 
The entire region was in a humanitarian and environmental depression, and all ASEAN 
nations were bound to suffer consequences.56 No doubt, the foreign policy of Myanmar’s 
junta was evidence of ‘policy failure’. Refusing the help of external donors, whose ships 
had been left for weeks anchored in the Adaman Sea,57 the lack of capability to provide 
assistance to its people was unquestionable. ‘Crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ were evident in 
the context within which the ASEAN’s relief operation took place.58 These reasons 
connect with the account that the development of new purposes, commitments and roles 
was more likely ‘where the group felt itself in a crisis or was faced with clear and 
incontrovertible evidence of policy failure’.59 
 
New motivations, sense of duty and norms  
The discussion concerning the actors developing new interests and preferences via 
interactions with other settings was supported by several justifications that the 
interviewees provided. The frequency and intensity of the groups’ networking generated 
new ambitions and motivations; the persuasive capability of those involved in the 
Forum’s activities had the power of influencing the preferences within the groups; and 
the duty to assume a leading role in assisting Myanmar was supported by the critical 
situation and, also, by the perception of Myanmar’s policy failure. Altogether, these 
explanations offered reasons for the unexpected reaction of ASEAN in offering support 
to Myanmar’s crisis.  
The interviewees shed light on a further scenario which agrees with the indication that 
social dynamics created new drives which grew via contact with other contexts.60 The 
officers from the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination section, and from 
                                                        
56 Ibid.  
57 A. SELTH, op. cit. 
58 Southeast Asian security policy analyst (G), questioned in Singapore (February 2014), believed that the 
intervention in Indonesia’s Aceh region, in collaboration with the EU, in 2005, was of support to the 
ASEAN’s new initiative. The commentator suggested that the Aceh Monitoring Mission served as a 
formative preparation and facilitated the institution of the Humanitarian Task Force and the Tripartite Core 
Group to organise the aid that focused entirely on Myanmar (Interview (G), 2014).  
59 J.T. CHECKEL, p. 549, op. cit.  
60 Ibid, 548.  
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the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office stated that their own activity 
within the groups and sub-groups had the purpose of transmitting new norms, with the 
aim that these norms would be assimilated and lead to others’ undertakings.61 Hence, the 
EEAS officers suggested that conveying new norms, such as the encouragement to 
cooperate delivered by the EU at the Forum, to the task of having them understood and 
absorbed, was enabling, if not promoting, the development of individuals or groups’ new 
endeavours. Ultimately, the interviewees backed the proposition that, by providing 
support to Myanmar in a time of crisis, the EU’s call to undertake responsibilities was 
essentially respected by ASEAN.  
 
6. Post-Nargis Myanmar’s behaviour examined:  
Inspired by the EU’s confidence-building dialogue and  
the call for multilateral security efforts?  
It may be, similarly, useful to consider how the other new development that emerged in 
connection with Nargis’ violence, the Myanmar junta’s softened non-interference stance, 
became possible. To interpret this position, it might help to observe that the strategic 
calculation of rational bargaining of a government’s protection and defence of what it 
perceives as its national interest confronts, but frequently, also, becomes reconciled with 
the position of other states on the same policy issue.62 In the post-Nargis situation, the 
strategic calculation of rational bargaining by the Myanmar’s junta challenged the 
position of the other actors, specifically ASEAN, and the ASEAN Secretariat which was 
willing to network with the Myanmar’s government. The rational bargaining challenge 
was, firstly, manifested by the junta’s rejection of external help, and its protection of the 
political order that it held dear, and the defence of what it perceived to be the national 
interest.  
Late dynamism for change: An appropriateness logic 
Only subsequently, a different logic emerged which was manifested by late forces for 
change. An interviewed Myanmar historian believed that the ethical dimension of the 
responsibility to protect its own people was a true response which became more definite                                                         
61 L. Marchi, Interview with official (B)…, Crisis Response…, Brussels, 2014, op. cit.; L. Marchi, 
Interview with official (C), Rapid Response Coordinator…, Brussels, June 2014.     
62 J.G. MARCH, J.P. OLSEN, The Institutional Dynamics…, 1998, op. cit., 950.     
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only successively.63 Also, the collective norms of the ASEAN group to reduce the risk to 
security (as established in the ARF’s Concept Paper of 1995) was another motivation 
leading to change that was confirmed by an officer of the ASEAN Secretariat.64 A further 
motive was proposed by a Singaporean security analyst:65 the collective norm of avoiding 
undermining the efforts of the ASEAN group to strengthen regionalism in Southeast 
Asia. Another explanation, by the same expert, held that the pressure felt by the junta to 
comply with the Seven Steps programme (combined with the need to be more 
accommodating vis-à-vis ASEAN’s offer of networking) acted as an incentive to support 
the new reasoning.66 An additional motive was suggested by a further security analyst,67 
i.e. the confidence factor justifying Myanmar’s junta’s reliance that the mission was to 
remain under its own control; the interviewee contended that the Myanmar government’s 
control of the operation was key to its acceptance.68 This assertion simply recalls the 
EU’s efforts, at ARF, to develop confidence-building dialogues and generate a reliance 
on security and humanitarian operations.  
An evolutionary process built up Myanmar’s behaviour. Interviewees offered 
suggestions, and several issues arose: the ethical dimension together with the collective 
norms of the ASEAN group to control security, a new-born attention to the ASEAN’s 
efforts to bolster regionalism, and the obligation to conform to the Seven Steps agenda. 
Also the understanding that cooperation with ASEAN was overdue, and, in particular, the 
trust that the mission was to remain under the junta’s own control contributed to the 
shifted position. All of these observations justified the new logic that inspired Myanmar 
and was identifiable as a logic of appropriateness.69 
When asked whether Myanmar’s acceptance of assistance from ASEAN (and other 
actors) might have had a relation with the EU’s attempts to involve Yangon in 
multilateral security efforts, the interviewees assisted once again. The interviewees’ 
observations helped to realise that the incentives to change, which they highlighted, were                                                         
63 L. Marchi, Interview with Myanmar historian (H), Yangon, July 2014.  
64 L. Marchi, Interview with Officer (I) of the ASEAN Secretariat, Macau, May 2013.   
65 L. Marchi, Interview with security analyst (J), Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Singapore, February 2014. 
66 Ibid.  
67 L. Marchi, Interview with security policy analyst (G), Singapore, February 2014.  
68 Ibid.  
69 J.G. MARCH, J.P. OLSEN, pp. 951-2, op. cit.  
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aspects of the policy that the EU proposed at the Forum. Undoubtedly, the ethical 
dimension of the responsibility to protect its own people was distinct to the EU, and 
similarly the belief in the value of collective regional security. Likewise, the trust in 
reinforcing regionalism in Southeast Asia was key to both the EU’s idea of security and 
participation in the ARF. Also the duty of Myanmar’s junta to engage in reforms had 
always been demanded by the EU. Certainly, the principle of continuing cooperation 
among the regional partners was an attitude that the EU recommended at all times. 
Finally, the motivations supported by the interviewees made clear a connection with the 
EU’s encouragement of Myanmar to participate in multilateral security solutions.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper’s observation of the historical context concerning the EEC/EU’s relations with 
ASEAN in their economic and political aspects and the ARF highlighted the EEC/EU’s 
security interest in the Forum. The paper’s emphasis on the EU’s efforts at the ARF 
meetings co-chaired by the EU to persuade Myanmar to rely on security cooperation 
underscored the role played by the EU. Importantly, this role was conveyed by the EU’s 
attempts to activate the various energies, drives and abilities of its ARF partners, ASEAN 
and Myanmar, such as a sense of duty and a greater capacity for cooperation. It was 
stressed by the EU’s promotion, in that arena, of its own identity, distinctiveness and 
uniqueness, and supported by its ambition, and belief, that others could benefit from the 
EU’s own experience, and correspond to the EU’s practices. It was emphasised by the EU 
taking every opportunity to confirm the relevance of the ARF framework, and was 
evidenced by the EU publicising, there, the multilateral attributes of its policy in the 
security area. With its focus on the ARF as a venue where interactions develop and grow, 
the paper showed how the prospect of transmitting messages at the Forum, combined 
with the aspiration or determination to convince others to conform to the behaviour 
addressed by the EU, were important dimensions of the EU’s policy. Such dimensions 
characterised the EU’s goal of expanding its influence outside its own region. Also, the 
paper showed how both ASEAN undertaking responsibilities and Myanmar accepting 
multilateral security options featured the EU’s influence and contribution to ARF as well 
as the EU’s promotion of security cooperation in the non-European world.  
